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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that authorizes the Department of Justice to civilly commit
federal prisoners after their release if they suffer from a mental illness
or abnormality that causes “serious difficulty in refraining from sexual1
ly violent conduct.” Not only has the federal government authorized
civil commitment for sexually violent predators, but as of 2009, twenty
2
states have also enacted statutes authorizing the same. By 2006, more
3
than 3646 people had been detained or committed under these laws.
Such commitments generally occur in secure mental health facilities,
4
some of which are connected to, or within, prisons. A person com5
mitted under a sexually violent predator law is committed until he no

1

United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 4247(a)(6) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute was upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 1965.
2
Adam Deming, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs: Current Practices, Characteristics, and Resident Demographics, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 439, 441 (2009).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 444. Of the states authorizing commitment, only Texas employs outpatient
treatment and supervision in lieu of inpatient commitment. Id.
5
Sex offenders may, of course, be male, female, or self-identify outside of traditional
gender norms. However, for the sake of convenience, and because the overwhelming
majority of sex offenders are male, I use male pronouns throughout this Comment.
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longer presents a danger to the community. This often results in
7
commitment for life; the New York Times reported that, as of 2007, only
250 civilly committed sex offenders had been released from confine8
ment. Often unsympathetic characters in the courtroom, sex offenders
face an uphill battle in proving that they should be set free despite
their past offenses.
Statutes providing for the civil commitment of sexually violent
predators typically require that the State prove at least three elements
before commitment can be effected: (1) the defendant must have
been convicted of, or at least have been charged with, a sexually violent offense; (2) the defendant must have a mental disorder or abnormality, generally defined as “a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the
person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting
9
such person a menace to the health and safety of others”; and (3)
there must be a prediction of future dangerousness—a likelihood that
10
the defendant will continue to engage in sexually violent behavior. In
the landmark decision Kansas v. Crane, the Supreme Court held that, in
6

See 51 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS § 13 (Supp. 2008) (“The SVP [sexually violent
predator] laws provide that a person can be released if it can be shown that his mental
disorder has changed to the extent that it is safe to release him, as he will no longer
engage in sexually violent acts.”).
7
See Mary Prescott, Note, Invasion of the Body Snatchers: Civil Commitment After Adam
Walsh, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 839, 854 (2010) (noting that very few civilly committed sex
offenders ever receive a full discharge).
8
See Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at A1 (“Nationwide, of the 250 offenders released unconditionally since the first law was passed in 1990, about half of them were let go on
legal or technical grounds unrelated to treatment.”).
9
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (Supp. 2008). Many commentators have noted
that the statutory definition of a mental illness or abnormality is all encompassing and
does not limit itself to what clinicians or even the general populace would naturally
consider as falling under these categories. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger,
Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 260-61 (1998) (stating that the
statutory definition of mental illness describes a person as abnormal “if any biological
or environmental variable caused the person’s emotional or volitional capacity to predispose the agent to engage in criminal sexual misconduct” and concluding that this definition is “simply a description of the causation of any behavior”); see also LOLA ROMANUCCIROSS & LAURENCE TANCREDI, WHEN LAW AND MEDICINE MEET: A CULTURAL VIEW 44 -45
(2007) (“This definition incorporates the causation of every conceivable behavior . . . [and] nothing about the definition . . . narrows the class of persons that can be
designated as ‘abnormal.’ The definition is entirely predicated on the presence of ‘criminal sexual acts’ and becomes a tautology, i.e. ‘mental abnormality’ equals ‘criminal sexual acts’ and vice versa, an equation that provides justification for commitment.”).
10
51 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS, supra note 6, § 8.
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addition to these statutory elements, “there must be proof of serious
difficulty in controlling behavior” before the state may, consistent with
11
due process, subject the defendant to civil commitment.
While the application of Crane’s holding—that there must be proof
that the offender lacks control—is problematic on account of its ambiguity, this Comment argues that there are ways in which courts can
better apply the standard to ensure that due process is provided to defendants. Specifically, Crane mandates that states require a separate
finding on the issue of whether the defendant has serious difficulty
12
controlling his behavior. In light of this mandate, states should attempt to operationalize the evidentiary requirement by developing a
standard definition—grounded in the norms and judgment of the
community—on the issue of what constitutes serious difficulty in controlling oneself to assure a more consistent and fair application of the
13
concept across cases. In addition, state courts should restrict expert
testimony to a qualitative description of the defendant’s ability to control himself rather than permitting experts to render ultimate conclusions. Lastly, juries should be instructed that there is no generally
accepted method for measuring volitional impairment in the mental
health community. These procedures will help ensure that the trier of
fact understands that “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behav14
ior” is a legal standard and can then properly weigh expert testimony.
It is important to note from the outset that this Comment, in arguing for a more stringent application of the control test to justify civil
commitment, does not argue that sex offenders should face less restrictive or less severe consequences for their actions. The sex offenders facing civil commitment in these cases have already been found
guilty of their crimes and have been punished by the criminal justice
system. The issue is whether some sex offenders should face civil
commitment after and in addition to the time they have already served
for their crimes. As explained by Professor Stephen Morse,

11

534 U.S. 407, 411-13 (2002).
See id. at 413 (explaining that, in order to justify civil commitment of a sex offender, “there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior,” such that the
“dangerous sexual offender” can be distinguished from the “typical recidivist”).
13
For an example of one scholar’s operational definition of “substantial difficulty
controlling oneself” as well as commentary on how this definition may be bolstered, see
infra note 139.
14
Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
12
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Our society routinely and regretfully releases from prison inmates we know
are highly likely to re-offend, because culpability limits the term of possible
confinement. Their prison term “cleanses” their culpability for past crime,
and no general form of pure preventative detention exists for responsible
agents who are simply dangerous, no matter how serious their past record
15
nor how predictable their future violence might be.

Thus, sex offenders do not face detention simply because society considers them likely to re-offend; offenders face detention only if society
16
also deems that they are substantially unable to control their behavior.
Because of this distinction, the factfinder’s determination on the issue
of control is an essential safeguard that limits the number of offenders
who are eligible for civil commitment. This Comment is premised on
the idea that our justice system must clearly define the rules for determining when a person who has already faced criminal punishment and
been “cleansed” of his prior crimes should be incapacitated indefinitely
via civil commitment solely for the future protection of the community.
Part I discusses the legal background of civil commitment for sexually violent predators, including the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane. Part II surveys and critiques
the various ways in which state appellate and supreme courts have construed the Supreme Court’s mandate in Crane that the State must prove
the defendant has serious difficulty controlling his behavior in order
to justify civil commitment. Part III provides recommendations for
how courts can better apply the control test going forward to ensure
that defendants facing civil commitment proceedings for sexually violent behavior are afforded due process.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVILLY COMMITTING
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
A. Kansas v. Hendricks: Addressing Due Process
Challenges to Civil Commitment
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act permits the State to civilly commit sexually violent predators. The statute defines a sexually
violent predator “as any person who has been convicted of or charged
with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage

15
16

Morse, supra note 9, at 253.
Crane, 534 U.S. at 411-12.
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17

in repeat acts of sexual violence.” It defines “mental abnormality” as “a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and
18
safety of others.” In Kansas v. Hendricks, the State sought to civilly
commit Leroy Hendricks, an inmate about to be released from prison
19
after serving time for sexually molesting children. Hendricks challenged the Act on substantive due process grounds, among others. The
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Kansas’s civil commit20
ment of sexually violent predators, as well as Hendricks’s confinement.
The Hendricks Court explained that the liberty afforded to citizens
by the Constitution is not absolute and that certain exceptions are
21
necessary for the “common good.” The Court noted that, under certain conditions, it had upheld statutes providing for the civil confinement of individuals who could not control their actions and who
22
posed a threat to the community. Articulating the narrow standard
under which a person may be committed, the Court explained that a
mere finding of dangerousness is generally insufficient to warrant
23
commitment. However, proof of a mental illness or abnormality that
is linked to the finding of dangerousness “serve[s] to limit involuntary
civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment
rendering them dangerous beyond their control,” thereby fulfilling
24
the narrow tailoring required by the Due Process Clause. The Court
left individual states with the discretion to define what constitutes a
mental illness or abnormality and explained that the legal significance
25
of these terms need not directly equate with medical standards. In
specifically upholding Hendricks’s civil commitment, the Court found
that an “admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction
of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishe[d] Hendricks from
other dangerous persons who [were] perhaps more properly dealt with
26
exclusively through criminal proceedings.”
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2008).
Id. § 59-29a02(b).
521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
Id. at 368-69.
Id. at 356-57 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)).
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 360.
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B. Kansas v. Crane: Closing the Gap Left Open by Hendricks
Hendricks’s reference to lack of control left uncertainty in the governing law—namely, whether a showing that a defendant completely lacked
27
the ability to control himself was necessary to justify civil commitment.
Kansas v. Crane directly answered this question but left further ambiguity
in its wake. In Crane, the State sought civil commitment of Michael
Crane, who had previously been convicted of aggravated sexual battery
28
and lewd and lascivious behavior for exposing himself. Crane argued
that the Constitution required the State to show that he could not con29
trol his dangerous behavior in order to commit him. The Supreme
Court first stated that Hendricks did not establish a requirement of total
lack of control, explaining that “Hendricks referred to the Kansas Act as
requiring a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes
it ‘difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous
30
behavior.’” The Court then stated that the Constitution did not allow
the State to commit a sex offender without any lack-of-control finding;
the “distinction is necessary lest ‘civil commitment’ become a ‘mechanism for retribution or general deterrence’—functions properly those
31
of criminal law, not civil commitment.”
The Crane Court acknowledged that lack of control was a difficult
concept to define and quantify. Justice Breyer wrote:
[W]e did not give to the phrase “lack of control” a particularly narrow or
technical meaning. And we recognize that in cases where lack of control is
at issue, “inability to control behavior” will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious
difficulty in controlling behavior. And this, when viewed in light of such
features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical
32
recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.

27

See, e.g., People v. Kirk, No. A094086, 2001 WL 1659543, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec.
28, 2001) (discussing different states’ pre-Crane interpretations of what Hendricks required, including whether the standard for commitment required “total lack of control” or merely “volitional control that [is] impaired at some level”).
28
In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286-87 (Kan. 2000), vacated sub nom. Kansas v. Crane, 534
U.S. 407 (2002).
29
Id. at 288.
30
Crane, 534 U.S. at 411 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
31
Id. at 412 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
32
Id. at 413.
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The Court again acknowledged that states have “considerable leeway”
in defining the mental abnormalities that might justify civil commit33
ment. It noted that pedophilia, the disorder from which Crane suffered, “critically involves what a lay person might describe as a lack of
control” and that “it is often appropriate to say of such individuals, in
ordinary English, that they are ‘unable to control their dangerous34
ness.’” The Court nonetheless vacated the Kansas Supreme Court’s
35
36
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
C. Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Crane
Justice Scalia wrote an oft-referenced dissenting opinion in Crane,
in which he claimed that the majority had misconstrued Hendricks by
requiring a separate finding pertaining to an individual’s lack of control. Rather, Justice Scalia argued, “[w]hat the [Hendricks] opinion was
obviously saying was that the SVPA’s [Sexually Violent Predator Act]
required finding of a causal connection between the likelihood of repeat
acts of sexual violence and the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or
‘personality disorder’ necessarily establishes ‘difficulty if not impossibility’
37
in controlling behavior.” Justice Scalia would have held that a finding
of lack of control inhered in the finding of a mental abnormality that
38
Justice Scalia also bemoaned the
caused future dangerousness.
Court’s failure to define lack of control as a legal criterion and lamented that the majority opinion “gives trial courts, in future cases under
the many commitment statutes similar to Kansas’s SVPA, not a clue as to
39
how they are supposed to charge the jury!”
D. Control and the Insanity Defense
The debate about whether lack of control can be demonstrated in a
legal or clinical context originated outside of the civil commitment context. Most notably, the 1982 trial of John Hinckley Jr. brought the issue
33

Id.
Id. at 414-15 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
35
The Kansas Supreme Court had held that the Constitution, as interpreted in
Hendricks, required “a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior,” and found that the trial court committing Hendricks had made no such finding.
In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 290 (Kan. 2000).
36
Crane, 534 U.S. at 415.
37
Id. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
38
Id. at 420.
39
Id. at 423.
34
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of volitional impairment to the attention of both the legal and medical
40
Hinckley, who attempted to assassinate President
communities.
Ronald Reagan, was found not guilty by reason of insanity under a volitional test that “exculpate[d] an offender who lack[ed] substantial ca41
pacity . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” The
decision prompted the legal and medical communities to call for the
42
elimination of this “irresistible impulse” test. The American Bar Association (ABA) released a report recommending that the insanity defense only be available to a defendant who was “unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct,” since “[m]ost academic commentary . . . continues to question the scientific basis for assessments of voli43
Similarly, the American Psychiatric Association
tional incapacity.”
(APA) noted that psychiatrists debated the meaning of volitional impairment and that “[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an
impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight
44
and dusk.” As a result of pressure from these organizations and the
general public, several states and the federal government subsequently
45
eliminated the volitional tests from their insanity defense statutes.
Because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crane, the same concerns
that led states to eliminate the volitional element of the insanity defense
now plague civil commitment decisions. As one commentator has
opined, “The unintended irony is that volitional impairment lacks the
40

See Bd. of Trs. Comm. on Medicolegal Problems, Am. Med. Ass’n, Insanity Defense
in Criminal Trials and Limitation of Psychiatric Testimony: Report of the Board of Trustees, 251
JAMA 2967, 2970 (1984) [hereinafter Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials] (noting that
Hinckley’s acquittal “served to focus national attention on the insanity defense” and led
to “[w]idespread public outrage”); see also Jonathan B. Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity
Defense Reexamined, 94 YALE L.J. 1545, 1548-52 (1985) (describing the trial of John
Hinckley Jr., the reaction of the general public, and the shifting opinions of the psychiatric community).
41
Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials, supra note 40, at 2970 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
42
See id. (discussing how the ABA adopted a policy eliminating the “volitional” test
and replacing it with the question of “whether the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the
time of the offense charged”).
43
Report of the Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice and
Commission on the Mentally Disabled, 108 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 715, 715-16 (1986); see also
Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials, supra note 40, at 2970-71 (describing ABA and APA
reform proposals).
44
Insanity Defense Work Grp., American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity
Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983).
45
Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1214 (2000).
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empirical basis for exculpation in federal insanity cases, but clearly is
46
justified for the indefinite detention of sex offenders.”
II. STATE APPLICATIONS OF CRANE ’S
LACK-OF-CONTROL STANDARD
While the Crane Court conclusively held that lack of control is essential to the constitutionality of civilly committing sex offenders, it
declined to articulate a way in which lower courts should actually apply
this criterion. After Hendricks and Crane, state courts were left to define the meaning of and evidentiary requirements for the lack-ofcontrol standard individually, although many of these states had reject47
ed the lack-of-control standard as unworkable for the insanity defense.
Consequently, states have developed numerous approaches, which can
48
be broken down into three groups. First, three states have adopted
an implicit lack-of-control approach: courts in these jurisdictions do
not actually instruct the jury on the issue of control, but rather subscribe to the idea that proof of a mental abnormality predisposing one
to engage in acts of sexual violence, combined with a showing of future dangerousness, necessarily entails proof that the defendant serious49
ly lacks control over his behavior. Second, seven states have adopted
a nested lack-of-control approach, in which the court reads the statutory requirement of a mental abnormality or illness as requiring that
the abnormality or illness cause the defendant to have serious difficulty
50
Finally, eight states have adopted a recontrolling his behavior.

46

Richard Rogers, Imposing Order on Diverse Mental Health Laws, 48 CONTEMP. PSYCHOL.:
APA REV. OF BOOKS 158, 159 (2003) (book review).
47
Slobogin, supra note 45, at 1214.
48
Other commentators have classified the states’ sexually violent predator statutes
somewhat differently from the scheme presented in this Comment. See generally State v.
White, 891 So. 2d 502, 508-09 (Fla. 2004) (noticing that Arizona, California, Illinois,
Massachusetts, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin do not interpret
Crane to require a separate finding on the issue of control, while Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and New Jersey “have found that Crane imposes an affirmative, additional duty to
determine lack of control”); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane’s “Serious Difficulty” Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L. REV. 291, 300-01 (2004) (classifying Arizona,
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin as states that do not require a separate finding of lack of control, but Iowa,
Missouri, and New Jersey as states that do require such a finding); Peter C. Pfaffenroth,
Note, The Need for Coherence: States’ Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas
v. Crane, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2229, 2249-50 (2003) (same).
49
See infra Section II.A.
50
See infra Section II.B.
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quirement that the government must prove, separate from the other
elements required for civil commitment, that the defendant has seri51
ous difficulty controlling his behavior.
This Comment criticizes each of the three approaches to applying
the control standard, concluding that (1) jurisdictions embracing the
first approach are disregarding the Supreme Court’s holding in Crane
and have essentially adopted Justice Scalia’s dissent as the law; (2)
states that utilize the second approach, while faithful to Crane, make it
too easy for juries to conflate a mental abnormality with difficulty controlling oneself, even though these two concepts should be treated as
analytically distinct; and (3) states adopting an approach that requires
a separate finding of the defendant’s lack of control have failed to operationalize this concept and rely too heavily on opinions from expert
witnesses. This last approach risks turning the separate finding on the
issue of control into an empty legal conclusion that necessarily follows
from the facts of any case.
A. The Implicit Lack-of-Control Theory
1. Declining to Require Specific Proof of Lack of Control
Surprisingly, despite the Supreme Court’s clear language that
“there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior” to
52
justify civil commitment, a number of states have failed to adopt a
separate jury finding requirement on the issue of control. These jurisdictions interpret Crane to require some evidence of an offender’s lack
of control but not a separate finding. When the state proves that the sex
offender has a mental abnormality and a likelihood of future dangerousness, these courts conclude that evidence of lack of control is necessarily shown.

51

See infra Section II.C. Of the twenty states with civil commitment statutes, two
were omitted from this analysis. New Hampshire was omitted for lack of pertinent case
law. Pennsylvania was omitted because its civil commitment statute is limited to persons aging out of the juvenile system, a factor which may change the relevant analysis
and invoke ancillary issues not addressed in this Comment. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6358 (2006) (calling for civil commitment hearings for minors who have been adjudicated delinquent for an act of sexual violence and who remain incarcerated in a juvenile detention center upon reaching twenty years of age).
52
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
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The first case to adopt this implicit lack-of-control theory was In re
53
Commitment of Laxton. John Lee Laxton was found to be a sexually
violent predator under Wisconsin’s civil commitment statute after being convicted and serving a prison sentence for offenses including
54
sexual assault, child abduction, and window peeping on young girls.
Laxton argued that his civil commitment determination was unconstitutional because the jury was not instructed to determine whether he
had a mental disorder involving serious difficulty controlling his behav55
ior. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a separate finding
that Laxton’s mental disorder involved lack of control was not required, because it was already established by the nexus between his
56
mental disorder and his dangerousness. The court explained that
“evidence showing that the person’s mental disorder predisposes such
individual to engage in acts of sexual violence, and evidence establishing a substantial probability that such person will again commit such
acts, necessarily and implicitly include[] proof that such person’s men57
tal disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling his . . . behavior.”
Once Wisconsin established that a state could validate its current
commitment statute under Crane without adding an additional requirement to the State’s burden of proof, other states quickly embraced the implicit lack-of-control theory. In 2004, the Supreme Court
of Florida held that Crane did not impose an additional element to jus58
tify civil commitment. Rather, under the Florida statute, the State has
to prove only that a sex offender suffers from a mental abnormality that
“predisposes him to commit sexually violent offenses” and that the per-

53

647 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. 2002); see also Eric G. Barber, Note, State v. Laxton: How the
Wisconsin Supreme Court Ignored the U.S. Supreme Court (And Why It May Have Gotten Away
with It), 2003 WIS. L. REV. 977, 1002, 1006 (explaining that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear Laxton’s appeal only seven days after the U.S. Supreme
Court issued its Crane opinion and noting that in Laxton, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
set a lower bar than the Supreme Court did in Crane).
54
In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 787.
55
Id. at 786.
56
Id. at 786-87, 793.
57
Id. After the hearing committing Laxton, Wisconsin changed its jury instructions
to include a reference to lack of control, providing that “‘[m]ental disorder’ means a
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to
engage in acts of sexual violence and causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”
Id. at 794 n.14. However, the Laxton court noted that it rendered its decision using
only the old instructions that contained no reference to control. Id.
58
State v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 509 (Fla. 2004).
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son is “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.” Like the Laxton
court, the White court concluded that “[o]ne who fits such a description
60
necessarily will have difficulty controlling his behavior.”
While the Texas Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the issue, several appellate cases have adopted the implicit lack-of-control
theory. In In re Commitment of Taylor, Billy Robert Taylor, whose criminal history included several convictions for rape and burglary with attempt to rape, appealed a trial court’s judgment that he was a sexually
violent predator and was properly subject to involuntary civil commit61
ment. Texas’s civil commitment statute required the State to prove
that Taylor had a mental abnormality “that, by affecting a person’s
emotional or volitional capacity, predispose[d] him to commit a sex62
ually violent offense.” Taylor argued that the trial court erred in
denying his proposed jury instructions, which would have required the
jury to also find that Taylor had “serious difficulty controlling behav63
64
ior.” The appellate court rejected his argument, explaining that a
jury’s finding that a person was predisposed “to threaten the health
and safety of others with acts of sexual violence entails a determination
65
that he has ‘serious difficulty in controlling behavior.’”
2. The Implicit Lack-of-Control Approach Disregards Crane
Jurisdictions adopting an implicit lack-of-control theory have disregarded the Supreme Court’s mandate in Crane. In fact, many commentators have noted that states embracing this theory have essentially
66
adopted Justice Scalia’s dissent as the law. These states typically ar59

Id. at 509-10 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.912(4)–(5) (1999)).
Id. at 510.
61
No. 09-10-00231-CV, 2010 WL 4913948, at *1 (Tex. App. Dec. 2. 2010).
62
Id. at *3 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.002(2) (West Supp.
2009)).
63
Id.
64
Id. at *4.
65
In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 505 (Tex. App. 2003) (quoting
In re Commitment of Browning, 113 S.W.3d 851, 863 (Tex. App. 2003)).
66
Chief Justice Abrahamson’s dissent in In re Commitment of Laxton espouses this
view: “The majority opinion’s linkage or nexus analysis of the jury instructions adopts
Justice Scalia’s dissenting view in Crane. . . . The court is obliged to follow the majority
opinion in Crane, not the dissent.” 647 N.W.2d 784, 797-98 (Wis. 2002) (Abrahamson,
C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413
(2002), and id. at 419-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Barber, supra note 53, at 991 (“In a final jab at the majority and the Kansas Supreme Court, Justice Scalia wrote: ‘There is an obvious lesson here for state supreme
60
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gue that the Supreme Court’s endorsement of state discretion to define legal terms like “mental abnormality” and “lack of control” provides them with the latitude to find lack of control implicit in the other
67
elements required for commitment. These states also emphasize the
fact that Crane did not overrule Hendricks, which did not require a sepa68
rate finding on the issue of Hendricks’s ability to control himself.
Neither of these arguments carries any weight. Surely the Crane
Court, in granting the states leeway to determine the precise meaning
of lack of control, did not intend to provide states with the discretion
to adopt a dissenting Justice’s opinion. Reliance on the fact that the
Crane Court did not overrule Hendricks is similarly misguided because in
Hendricks, the issue of control was not in dispute—Hendricks admitted
69
that he had serious difficulty controlling himself. By contrast, in Crane,
in which the central issue was the defendant’s ability to control himself,
the Court vacated the Kansas high court’s decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings in light of its ruling that the state must of70
fer some proof that the defendant is unable to control himself. The
Crane Court thus responded to an issue that the Hendricks Court did not
have the occasion to address. As such, Crane did not overrule Hendricks

courts that do not agree with our jurisprudence: ignoring it is worth a try.’ His advice
did not go unheeded.” (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting))); Gaines,
supra note 48, at 299-300 (“The trend of state appellate courts, with Justice Scalia’s
blessing, has been to ignore Crane. . . . These state court decisions are contrary to the
Court’s determination in Crane, which required specific proof of ‘serious difficulty controlling behavior.’” (citations omitted)); Pfaffenroth, supra note 48, at 2250 (“[T]he
courts appear to be following Justice Scalia’s dissent, not the majority holding, by finding an implicit lack of volitional control in the determination that an offender suffers
from a mental abnormality.”).
67
See, e.g., In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 791 (describing how the Crane court eschewed
the use of “precise bright-line rules” to safeguard constitutional rights in the area of
mental illness and instead gave the states “considerable leeway” to define terms like
“mental abnormality” in civil commitment statutes (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 413)).
68
See State v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 510 (Fla. 2004) (finding it significant that
Crane upheld Hendricks even though Hendricks had not required the jury to find that the
defendant had “‘serious difficulty in controlling behavior’” (citation omitted)).
69
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997) (“Hendricks admitted that he
had repeatedly abused children whenever he was not confined. He explained that
when he ‘get[s] stressed out,’ he ‘can’t control the urge’ to molest children. . . . He
stated that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing children in the future was ‘to die.’” (citations omitted)); see also Pfaffenroth, supra note 48, at 2250 (arguing that there was proof of lack of control on the record in Hendricks but not in Crane).
70
Crane, 534 U.S. at 415.
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but rather expanded upon the decision by requiring proof of a sex of71
fender’s volitional impairment in order to comport with due process.
Most importantly, the implicit lack-of-control theory does not actually provide any proof of the defendant’s inability to control himself.
The Laxton court explained that the “key to constitutionality” was the
fact that a sex offender’s mental disorder must have “the specific effect
72
of predisposing [him] to engage in acts of sexual violence.” However, a “predisposition”—which under the Wisconsin statute can be a
73
mental condition that is congenital or acquired, essentially including
any causal agent whatsoever—has no bearing on whether that person
74
can ultimately control himself. To understand this distinction, one
could consider how a hypothetical man with perfect self-control would
measure up under the implicit lack-of-control theory. A person with
perfect self-control may nevertheless be shown to have a mental disorder predisposing him to engage in acts of sexual violence. As psychologists have explained, a person’s predispositions do not necessarily bear
75
on his volitional capacity. Further, not all predispositions come to frui76
tion. The person with perfect self-control may also fulfill the Laxton
71

“Because Crane did not overrule Hendricks, many states narrowly read Crane as
implicitly approving the Hendricks position that requires no separate finding as to volitional impairment.” Gaines, supra note 48, at 315. According to Gaines, these states
ignore the fact that the Supreme Court vacated rather than reversed the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment in Crane. Such a move by the Court “clarified that Crane was
not a blind reaffirmation of Hendricks, but instead a clarification that requires states to
add additional due process protections beyond those that may be implicit in their statutory definitions of mental abnormality.” Id.
72
In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 790 (quoting State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 124
(Wis. 1995)).
73
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(2) (West Supp. 2008).
74
The American Psychiatric Association has explained that psychiatry, as a deterministic science, “views all human behavior as, to a large extent, ‘caused.’” Insanity
Defense Work Grp., supra note 44, at 685. The suggestion is that mere causation, in
reference to a mental abnormality or state, should not be probative on the issue of
whether a defendant has or lacks control.
75
See Michael B. First & Robert L. Halon, Use of DSM Paraphilia Diagnoses in Sexually
Violent Predator Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 450 (2008) (“Do
not assume that diagnosis of a paraphilia implies volitional impairment. One needs to
provide positive evidence that the offender has difficulty controlling his sexually assaultive behavior as a result of the paraphilia or of a comorbid condition.”); cf. State v. Rosado, 889 N.Y.S.2d 369, 382-83 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (“The two concepts of predisposition and
volition are separate and distinct, like ‘apples and oranges.’ A disorder, like pedophilia,
might predispose someone to the commission of sex offenses, but the offender might
have a great degree of control over the predisposition.” (citation omitted)).
76
For a simple illustration, consider a person with a genetic “predisposition” toward obesity, who nonetheless due to lifestyle choices never becomes obese.
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court’s second criterion—that he has a high likelihood of again committing sexual offenses—because he chooses to do so, exercising his perfect self-control. This exercise demonstrates that fulfilling the Laxton
court’s burden of proof for commitment does not necessarily prove
anything regarding a sex offender’s ability to control himself. This
standard contradicts the Supreme Court’s ruling that “there must be
77
proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” Thus, the states
that disregard the holding of Crane remove a key constitutional safeguard from jury consideration.
The dissenting opinion in Florida’s State v. White aptly criticized this
approach, noting that “the entity charged with resolving the most important and core issue in the proceedings is not even told about the
78
issue.” Empirical studies buttress the idea that decisionmakers do not
consider the defendant’s actual lack of control under the implicit lackof-control formulation. One Florida study found that psychologists’
and psychiatrists’ recommendations that civil commitment was appropriate under the Florida law could be predicted based on the following
attributes of sex offenders: diagnoses of pedophilia and paraphilia not
otherwise specified, actuarial risk assessment instrument scores, psy79
While this
chopathy, younger victim age, and nonminority race.
study did not directly test for volitional impairment as a factor predicting commitment, it is notable that the enumerated factors, none of
which directly bears on an individual’s capacity for self-control, could
80
predict decisions with ninety percent accuracy. Thus, in addition to
the fact that the elements of these states’ civil commitment statutes do
not necessitate a judgment regarding the defendant’s ability to control
himself, this study suggests that considerations of control do not play a
81
determinative role in practice.

77

Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
891 So. 2d 502, 516 (Fla. 2004) (Anstead, J., dissenting).
79
Jill S. Levenson & John W. Morin, Factors Predicting Selection of Sexually Violent
Predators for Civil Commitment, 50 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY
609, 625-26 (2006).
80
Id. at 621. For a discussion of which factors decisionmakers tend to consider
when actually instructed to determine whether the defendant suffers from a volitional
impairment, see infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
81
The study also notes that “evaluator recommendations have been found to predict court outcomes.” Levenson & Morin, supra note 79, at 613 (citing N. Zoe Hilton &
Jaret L. Simmons, The Influence of Actuarial Risk Assessment in Clinical Judgments and Tribunal Decisions About Mentally Disordered Offenders in Maximum Security, 25 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 393, 393-94 (2001)).
78
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B. The Nested Lack-of-Control Theory
1. Including Lack of Control in the Definition
of “Mental Abnormality”
A second group of states does not require a separate jury finding
on the issue of lack of control but does require a tighter nexus between the sex offender’s mental abnormality and future dangerousness. Like the implicit lack-of-control states, these states’ sexually
violent predator statutes explicitly permit commitment where an individual has been previously convicted of a sexually violent offense and
has a mental abnormality that makes him likely to engage in future
82
sexually violent acts. But whereas jurisdictions adopting the implicit
lack-of-control theory require only that the mental abnormality predispose an offender to engage in sexually violent acts (and never explicitly
mention control), jurisdictions adopting this nested lack-of-control
approach explicitly require the mental abnormality to cause a lack of
control by reading this requirement into the statutory definition of
“mental abnormality.” This interpretation of Crane—nesting the idea
of loss of control in the definition of a mental disorder or abnormality
and actually explaining this connection to the jury—has gained popularity in several jurisdictions.
In In re Leon G., the Arizona Supreme Court held that Crane did not
require the State to change the language of its civil commitment statute
to include a “serious difficulty in controlling behavior” requirement
but emphasized that such statutes should meaningfully narrow the
83
With this view of
group of individuals eligible for commitment.
Crane, the court found that Arizona’s civil commitment statute, which
requires that the State prove that a sex offender “[h]as a mental disor84
der that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence,”
meets the constitutional requirement that such a statute be narrowly
85
tailored. The court construed the word “makes” as meaning “impair[ing] or tend[ing] to overpower the person’s ability to control his

82

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 6600(3) (West Supp. 2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/5 (2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
123A, § 1 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44 -48-30(1) (Supp. 2008); WASH. REV.
CODE § 71.09.020(1) (2011).
83
59 P.3d 779, 786 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc).
84
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7)(b) (2001).
85
In re Leon G., 59 F.3d at 787.

Pierson FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)4/17/2012 6:45 PM

1544

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 160: 1527

86

or her behavior” and found that “[a]lthough the statute does not
mimic Crane’s ‘serious difficulty in controlling behavior’ language, the
statute necessarily requires the state to prove that an alleged SVP’s
dangerousness results from a mental impairment rather than from
87
voluntary behavior.”
The Arizona court’s holding is a variation on that in Laxton, because the Arizona court emphasized the causal connection between
the requisite mental disorder and future dangerousness, explaining
that “serious difficulty in controlling” behavior requires proof that a
mental disorder, as opposed to a voluntary decision, caused the person
88
to act as he did. The Arizona court specifically rejected the Laxton
court’s jury instructions because they did not clearly explain this causal
connection and instead adopted the following instruction: “[a]n individual’s dangerousness must be caused by a mental disorder which, in
turn, causes the person to have serious difficulty in controlling his or
89
her behavior.” Several other jurisdictions have adopted a similar ap90
proach with their civil commitment statutes.
86

Id. (quoting In re Detention of Wilber W., 53 P.3d 1145, 1149 (Ariz Ct. App.
2002), vacated, 62 P.3d 126 (Ariz. 2003)).
87
Id. at 786.
88
Id. at 787.
89
Id. at 788.
90
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act (SDPA) was constitutional under Crane because the court “construe[s] the term
‘mental disorder,’ as used in the SDPA, to mean a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in the
commission of sex offenses and results in serious difficulty controlling sexual behavior.”
People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 749 (Ill. 2003). Similarly, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that a statute fulfills due process if it requires the State to
show that the offender’s behavior resulted from “a mental condition that causes serious
difficulty in controlling behavior.” In re Dutil, 768 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (Mass. 2002).
The California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of jury instructions that
require the state to prove that a sex offender “has a mental disorder which seriously
impairs volitional control of violent sexual impulses.” People v. Superior Court
(Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 974 n.15 (Cal. 2002). In New York, the court of appeals found
that offenders are eligible for civil commitment where they have a mental abnormality
that causes “serious difficulty in controlling” their sexually violent urges. State v. Rashid, 942 N.E.2d 225, 238 (N.Y. 2010). Similarly, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held that “Crane does not mandate a court must separately and specially make a lack of
control determination,” but it does “require[] a court to determine an individual suffers from a mental illness which makes it seriously difficult, though not impossible, for
that person to control his dangerous propensities.” In re Treatment & Care of Luckabaugh, 568 S.E.2d 338, 348 (S.C. 2002). And in Washington, the state’s supreme court
explained that Crane did not mandate a separate jury finding on the issue of the defendant’s control, but it did require that the defendant’s mental disorder be linked “to
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2. The Nested Lack-of-Control Approach Conflates Mental
Abnormality with Lack of Control
Insofar as courts construe Crane as requiring proof of serious difficulty controlling behavior but not mandating a separate finding on the issue, these jurisdictions appear to follow the letter of the law. However,
the cases are problematic for a different reason. By collapsing the requirements of a mental disorder and lack of control into one finding
instead of two, these cases weaken Crane’s constitutional safeguard.
Specifically, this approach could lead the factfinder to improperly conflate the two discrete concepts and find that because a mental abnormality “causes” an individual to act in a certain way, the individual
must also lack substantial control over himself. Professor Morse has
explained that
identifying a cause for behavior, including an abnormal cause, does not
mean that the agent cannot control the behavior. Causation is not per se
an excusing condition; causation is not the opposite of control; the causal
link between abnormality and conduct is not mechanistically inexorable;
and it is simply not the case that all conduct causally influenced by mental abnormality also indicates a sufficient defect in rationality to warrant the conclusion that
the agent was not responsible. The causal link simply describes the causation
of action. Although all actions are caused, not all actions are generated by
91
lack of control capacity or by substantial rationality defects.

This position finds support in the psychiatric community, which has criticized expert witnesses for assuming that a diagnosis of a mental disor92
93
der, such as a paraphilia, automatically equates to a lack of control.
In fact, only a subset of those sex offenders that have a diagnosable par94
aphilia will also have difficulty controlling their deviant behavior.
By requiring that a defendant have a mental disorder that causes
volitional impairment, these statutes suggest that mental disorders and
a serious lack of control.” In re Detention of Audett, 147 P.3d 982, 989 (Wash. 2006)
(quoting In re Detention of Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 728 (Wash. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
Stephen J. Morse, Essay, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV.
1025, 1043 (2002) (emphasis added).
92
Paraphilia is a psychiatric term used to describe a deviant pattern of sexual
arousal. See See First & Halon, supra note 75, at 450 (describing the DSM-IV-TR definition of paraphilia and distinguishing volitional impairment from this definition).
93
See id. at 444 (suggesting that experts should not take it upon themselves to determine whether a defendant has a mental abnormality but rather should assist the
factfinder in making this determination).
94
Id. at 453. It also should be noted that not all sex offenders have a diagnosable
paraphilia. Id.
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volitional impairment go hand-in-hand. This suggestion opens the
door for the factfinder to conflate the two concepts rather than
95
Several state
properly keeping the concepts analytically distinct.
court commitment proceedings have demonstrated this error. Expert
witnesses frequently (and often successfully) argue for commitment by
relying on diagnoses that are widely criticized in the psychiatric community as not probative of the defendant’s volitional capacity, without
96
offering further evidence of the defendant’s lack of control. Even the
Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that a mental disorder implies a
97
lack of control. Observers may reasonably argue that presence of a
mental abnormality provides a good indicator of whether the defendant lacks control, but this rule is too broad to ensure due process of
law. As demonstrated, the rule potentially captures a multitude of persons with no volitional impairment. Further, allowing the burden to
be met with evidence that has no particular bearing on the issue would
render the lack-of-control requirement empty.

95

See, e.g., People v. Williams, 74 P.3d 779, 782 (Cal. 2003) (describing an expert
witness’s testimony that the “defendant does not ‘have very good control over his impulses or his emotions in general because he suffers from a mental illness’”).
96
Compare State v. Stout (In re Detention of Stout), 114 P.3d 658, 664 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2005) (finding that evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State justified commitment, where a psychiatrist testified that defendant’s antisocial personality
disorder [APD] and paraphilia caused him to have “difficulty in controlling his urges”),
and Roush v. State, No. 29679-9-II, 2004 WL 1157833, at *1, *7-9 (Wash. Ct. App. May
25, 2004) (finding that a diagnosis of “paraphilia not otherwise specified” involving
nonconsenting persons, a history of reoffending, and statements by the defendant indicating a desire to “break the cycle” were sufficient to support commitment), with
John Matthew Fabian, To Catch a Predator, and Then Commit Him for Life: Sex Offender
Risk Assessment (pt. 2), CHAMPION, Mar. 2009, at 32, 34-35 (noting that “offenders with
APD . . . have control over most, if not all, of their behaviors and are unwilling to restrain their impulses” and that there is a debate “as to whether the diagnosis Paraphilia
Not Otherwise Specified-Nonconsent (rape subtype) even exists” because of the lack of
research establishing its validity and the fact that rapes are often driven by the desire to
exercise power and control rather than out of sexual interest).
97
See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414 (2002) (describing pedophilia as “a mental
abnormality that critically involves what a lay person might describe as a lack of control”). But see First & Halon, supra note 75, at 450 (“It is important to understand that
having a diagnosis of a paraphilia does not imply that the person also has difficulty
controlling his behavior.”); Fabian, supra note 96, at 33 (arguing that a diagnosis of a
mental abnormality is not enough to show that a person lacks control such that he may
be committed).
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C. Control as a Separate Element for Commitment
1. Requiring a Separate Finding of a Sex
Offender’s Lack of Control
To justify civil commitment, a number of states require that the
factfinder make a separate finding regarding the defendant’s lack of
control. Thus, courts in these states generally interpret Crane to require the State to prove both that the defendant has serious difficulty
controlling his sexually violent behavior and that the state’s statutory
98
elements for commitment are met. States requiring a separate finding on the issue of control have not operationalized the Crane standard; rather, they have relied on case-specific factors and expert
testimony to civilly commit sex offenders.
a. Remanding Cases Without Giving a Standard
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that “the State must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious
difficulty controlling his or her harmful sexual behavior such that it is
highly likely that the person will not control his or her sexually violent
99
behavior and will reoffend.” The case, In re W.Z., concerned the civil
commitment of a man with a history of sexual assault crimes who had
been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and intermittent
100
The court remanded the case to the trial court
explosive disorder.
to determine whether the defendant had serious difficulty controlling
101
himself but gave no further guidance on how to determine the requisite degree of volitional impairment.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the civil commitment judgments against two defendants and remanded their cases
because both trial courts had given jury instructions that did not require a finding of whether the defendant’s mental abnormality caused
102
the defendant “serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.”
The
court noted that there was enough evidence to justify such a finding in
98

Statutes in Nebraska and Virginia explicitly require a showing that the defendant
has substantial difficulty controlling behavior, so courts do not have to read this requirement into the statutory language. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01 (2008); VA. CODE
ANN. § 37.2-900 (West Supp. 2010).
99
In re W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 219 (N.J. 2002).
100
Id. at 207-08.
101
Id. at 219.
102
Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 791-92 (Mo. 2002).
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both cases but remand was nonetheless necessary because the instructions failed to state the requirements for commitment in this “essential
103
way.” The court provided no further explanation of what constituted
“serious difficulty” in controlling behavior.
b. Affirming Commitment with a Factor-Based Approach
In Kansas, where Crane originated, the state has adopted pattern jury instructions that require the State to prove the defendant’s lack of
104
control as a separate element for commitment.
In In re Care &
Treatment of Ward, the Court of Appeals of Kansas found sufficient evidence to establish the defendant’s serious difficulty in controlling his
behavior due to his pedophilia, which an expert testified made the
defendant “likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence,” and his
105
resistance toward “therapeutic efforts to help control his behavior.”
The Supreme Court of North Dakota requires the State to prove,
“by expert evidence in the record,” that the defendant has difficulty
106
controlling his behavior.”
In In re Vantreece, the court upheld the
civil commitment of a sexually violent predator based on the trial
court’s specific findings that the defendant both demonstrated and
admitted to having uncontrolled anger, masturbated compulsively
while in jail, failed to cooperate in past treatments, lacked remorse,
107
and stalked several women.
c. Affirming Commitment By Relying on Expert Testimony
Some courts rely heavily on testimony from expert witnesses in determining whether the defendant has serious difficulty controlling
himself. For instance, because Iowa treats the issue of whether a sex
offender has serious difficulty controlling behavior as a separate element that the State must prove to justify civil commitment, its courts
108
In In re Detention of Barnes, the Suoften rely on expert testimony.
103

Id. at 792.
See KANSAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL, PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR KANSAS—CRIMINAL
57.40 (3d ed. 2006); see also State v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 512 (Fla. 2004) (noting the
post-Crane revision of Kansas’s pattern jury instructions).
105
131 P.3d 540, 551 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
106
State v. Vantreece (In re Vantreece), 771 N.W.2d 585, 590 (N.D. 2009).
107
Id. at 592.
108
See State v. Barnes (In re Detention of Barnes), 658 N.W.2d 90, 100 (Iowa 2003)
(“[D]ue process requires the State to show a person has ‘a serious difficulty in controlling behavior’ to support civil commitment as a sexually violent predator.”).
104
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preme Court of Iowa affirmed the civil commitment of a sexually violent predator who had been diagnosed with antisocial personality dis109
The court found that the issue of the defendant’s control
order.
“essentially turned on a judgment of credibility between two experts
with different opinions” regarding whether the defendant’s mental dis110
The court upheld the trial
order caused volitional impairment.
court’s decision to give greater weight to the testimony of a psychiatrist
who stated that “antisocial individuals with sexually violent histories[]
are the subset of antisocial personality disordered individuals that have
111
specific difficulty in controlling their behavior.” This testimony contradicted the testimony of a psychiatrist who explained that antisocial
personality disorder did not affect the ability to control behavior and
who argued that punishment of antisocial individuals should fall to the
112
criminal system.
Similarly, in In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that while “Crane adds to Hendricks the affirmative duty to
make a lack of control determination,” it provided no clear standard
113
for making that determination.
The court concluded that the district court had made specific findings on the interaction between
Ramey’s “past violent sexual behavior and his present mental disorders
114
In
or dysfunctions” that supported a lack-of-control determination.
affirming his commitment, the court also relied on an expert who testified that “Ramey lacked ‘utter control’ over his sexual impulses when
drinking or using cocaine,” both of which he was likely to use upon his
115
release from prison.
In order to justify commitment, Nebraska courts require the State
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is “substantially unable to control his criminal behavior,” meaning that the
defendant “ha[s] serious difficulty in controlling or resisting the desire
116
or urge to commit sex offenses.” In In re Interest of O.S., the Supreme
Court of Nebraska upheld a determination that the defendant was a

109

State v. Barnes (In re Detention of Barnes), 690 N.W.2d 455, 461 (Iowa 2004).
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
648 N.W.2d 260, 266-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
114
Id. at 268.
115
Id.
116
O.S. v. Mental Health Bd. (In re Interest of O.S.), 763 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Neb.
2009) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110
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“dangerous sex offender” on the basis of expert testimony that the defendant had been diagnosed “with psychopathy personality disorder,
exhibitionism, and paraphilia, . . . [and] lack[ed] the capacity or control, because of mental illness or other factors, to refrain from engag117
ing in a sexually inappropriate act.”
Virginia’s civil commitment statute explicitly requires the State to
prove that “because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder,
[the defendant] finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior” in
order for the defendant to be deemed a “sexually violent predator”
118
subject to commitment.
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld a
sexually violent predator’s commitment based on the opinion of a
clinical psychologist, who testified that the defendant “met the criteria
119
for a sexually violent predator” under Virginia law. Specifically, the
psychologist stated that the defendant suffered from pedophilia as well
as a personality disorder that “cause[d] him to violate society’s rules
and customs” and made it difficult for him to “control his predatory
120
behavior.”
2. Overreliance on Expert Testimony and
the Need for a Clear Standard
Jurisdictions that require the State to prove that the defendant has
serious difficulty controlling his sexually violent behavior clearly follow
Crane’s mandate that there must be proof of lack of control “to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the
dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal
121
case.” However, none of the states that have adopted this approach
has attempted to operationalize the control standard or explain exactly what the State must show to civilly commit a sex offender. The supreme courts of both New Jersey and Missouri remanded cases

117

Id. at 730.
VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (West Supp. 2010).
119
Boyce v. Commonwealth, 691 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Va. 2010).
120
Id.
121
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). Some commentators argue that the
only correct interpretation of Crane is that the Supreme Court was mandating a separate
jury finding regarding defendants’ lack of control in order to justify civil commitment.
See, e.g., Gaines, supra note 48, at 316 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s granting
certiorari, vacating, and remanding certain cases for reconsideration in light of Crane
demonstrates the Court’s requirement of a separate jury finding on lack of control).
118
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because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the issue of lack of
122
control. However, these states did not use the opportunity to articulate a clear definition of what constitutes lack of control and instead
123
simply reiterated the Supreme Court’s mandate in Crane.
At least one empirical study has examined what decisionmakers actually consider in determining whether a defendant lacks substantial
ability to control himself in the context of both civil commitment pro124
ceedings and insanity hearings.
Noting courts’ failure to clarify the
standard, the researchers found that legal professionals, psychologists,
and mock jurors consider the defendant’s verbalization of control
(such as an admitted lack of control), the defendant’s history of sexual
offenses, and the context of the proceeding to be the criteria most rel125
evant to a finding of volitional impairment. Moreover, decisionmakers were more likely to find volitional impairment in the context of a
126
As the
civil commitment proceeding than in an insanity hearing.
researchers noted, “[i]f the[se] are not the types of variables that
should ‘matter,’ then this suggests that the courts and legislatures need
to be more explicit in articulating” a standard for volitional impair127
ment. To give courts more explicit guidance, the research concluded,
legislatures and courts should explain how “these identified factors and
128
others support or fail to support a finding of volitional impairment.”
The fact that decisionmakers were more likely to find lack of control in the context of a commitment proceeding than in an insanity
hearing is especially distressing from the standpoint of assuring due
process because the context of the proceeding should have no bearing
on the determination of a defendant’s inherent biological or character
129
trait.
This research suggests that bias against sex offenders may
122

See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
See supra notes 93-97 & accompanying text.
124
See Cynthia Calkins Mercado et al., Decision-Making About Volitional Impairment in
Sexually Violent Predators, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 587, 589-90 (2006) (noting courts’ lack
of clarity and setting forth the study’s purpose in evaluating conceptions of volitional
impairment among different groups).
125
See id. at 597.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 600.
128
Id.
129
While there is nothing necessarily wrong with adopting different standards for
measuring control in different contexts, this study is noteworthy because the subjects
were not instructed to apply a different standard based on the context of the proceeding. See id. at 592. Thus, the fact that participants’ judgments regarding lack of control
depended on the context of the proceeding suggests that “participants may have been
123
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cause the concept of volitional impairment to be used as a sword to
130
civilly commit defendants more frequently than it is used as a shield
to exculpate defendants of criminal responsibility in the context of an
131
insanity hearing.
In addition to failing to operationalize the control standard, states
frequently err by identifying factors ex post that prove a defendant
lacks substantial ability to control himself. The supreme courts of
Kansas and North Dakota relied on a variety of factors, such as refusal
of treatment, paraphilia diagnoses, admissions by the defendant, and
patterns of past criminal sexual activity to uphold the civil commit132
The problem with this
ment determinations in Ward and Vantreece.
approach is that the courts did not identify ex ante the factors that
would be considered in making these determinations, nor did they
state that these factors should be determinative in cases going forward.
In essence, they declined to promulgate a rule for the future, and the
factors they identified served only to affirm the lower courts’ determinations. This approach makes it all too easy for a court to selectively
identify the factors that it wants to consider in a particular case based
on the outcome it hopes to reach. The unsympathetic nature of sex
offender defendants suggests that courts will identify factors that weigh
in favor of commitment.
Lastly, many cases err by relying almost exclusively on expert testimony in affirming commitment decisions, even though there is no
consensus among medical professionals on how to measure self133
Experts frequently reference only the defendant’s clinical
control.
diagnosis and past criminal conduct when providing an opinion on
134
whether the defendant has serious difficulty controlling himself.
However, drawing a conclusion that the defendant has a volitional immore apt to endorse a vacuous notion [of lack of control] when it supported continued
confinement over release . . . or incarceration over hospitalization.” Id. at 598.
130
That is, when the factfinder determines that a defendant has serious difficulty
controlling his behavior and should therefore be detained indefinitely, even though he
has already endured criminal sanctions.
131
That is, when a factfinder determines that because a defendant is substantially unable to control himself, he should not be culpable and subject to criminal punishment.
132
See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
133
See Holly A. Miller et al., Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations: Empirical Evidence,
Strategies for Professionals, and Research Directions, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 46 (2005)
(“In addition to the lack of agreed upon methodology to assess ‘inability to control,’ at
present there is no consistently utilized definition of just what is being assessed.”).
134
See, supra note 95 and accompanying text (recounting an expert’s testimony that
the defendant lacked control because he suffered from a mental illness).
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pairment from only a diagnosis and past offenses “is at best post hoc ergo
135
propter hoc reasoning, and at worst a complete tautology,” since the relevant diagnoses, like paraphilia or personality disorder, are constructs
drawn from evidence of past and current behavior and lack an identifi136
able underlying pathology that can be said to cause the behavior.
In addition to the fact that the mental health community has not
developed a consistent way to measure volitional impairment or identified its pathology, the usefulness of expert testimony is also tempered
because ultimately the question of the defendant’s capacity for selfcontrol is a legal, rather than a medical, issue. Thus, a medical professional’s conclusions regarding a defendant’s volitional impairment
may not have any correlation to the relevant legal standard. But because courts do not define the legal standard, they leave the door
open for medical judgment to substitute for legal judgment. The conflation of these two standards is contrary to the Court’s admonition in
Crane that the “science of psychiatry [should] inform[] but . . . not
control ultimate legal determinations” because its “distinctions do not
137
seek precisely to mirror those of the law.”
III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO COURTS APPLYING CRANE
States should construe Crane to require a separate finding on the issue of whether the defendant has serious difficulty controlling himself.
States adopting an implicit lack-of-control theory—in which lack of
control is necessarily proven by demonstrating that the defendant has
a mental abnormality that predisposes him to commit sexually violent
acts—have clearly disregarded the Court’s holding in Crane and incorrectly adopted Justice Scalia’s dissent as the law. Other jurisdictions that
adopt a slightly different interpretation of Crane—maintaining that the
defendant must have a mental abnormality that causes serious difficulty
controlling behavior—do not violate Crane insofar as the decision requires only that the State put forward some proof of lack of control in
order to commit the defendant. However, this construction of the stat-

135

Stephen D. Hart & P. Randall Kropp, Sexual Deviance and the Law, in SEXUAL DETHEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT 557, 564 (D. Richard Laws & William T.
O’Donohue eds., 2008).
136
Miller et al., supra note 133, at 41, 46-47 (discussing the classification of paraphilia and personality disorder and noting that they are classifications based on symptoms and behaviors alone).
137
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
VIANCE:
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ute makes it too easy for the factfinder to conflate a defendant’s mental
abnormality with volitional impairment.
The requirement of a separate finding is the best understanding of
the proof mandated by Crane. However, states that have embraced this
interpretation have failed to operationalize Crane’s control test—
leading to inconsistent and ad hoc decisions—and instead have relied
heavily on the opinions of experts who lack scientific backing for their
determinations.
A. Operationalizing the Control Standard
States should attempt to operationalize the rule that the defendant
must have serious difficulty controlling himself in order to justify civil
commitment. If we conceive of self-control as a spectrum and Crane’s
ruling as a vaguely directed mandate for high-stakes line drawing along
this spectrum, then states should more clearly elucidate the point
where decisionmakers should aim to draw the line. This guidance
could come in the form of a standardized list of factors that bear on the
138
issue of control or a definition of control that appeals to community
judgments, similar to the “reasonable person” standard. One potential
implementation of the control standard would ask the jury to consider
whether the offender would be likely to commit a sexually violent crime
in nearly all situations where punishment is not clearly imminent, and
whether the offender would want to exercise discipline over his de139
sires—although unable to do so—in these circumstances.
138

See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text for factors currently used by
some courts in making this determination.
139
This effort has its origins in Professor Michael Corrado’s scholarship. He has
developed a definition for determining whether someone is “substantially unable to
control his behavior and conform to the law.” Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility and
Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 88 (2005). That definition would require the following:
1. He committed the crime;
2. He did not suffer from a defect of rationality at the time; and
...
3(a). The desire that led him to perform the action that constituted the crime
would have done so, at that time, in any but the most exceptional circumstances.
Id. at 87-89. Professor Corrado explains that the “most exceptional” circumstances
should be determined by the community, in keeping with the criminal law’s tradition
of deferring to community judgment. Id. at 88. He notes that this inquiry should not
focus on whether there is any consequence that could make a person curb his offending
behavior—since even the “severely addicted” are unlikely to offend when there is a
“policeman at the elbow.” Id. Rather, the inquiry should focus on how severe a consequence must be to induce a person to curb his offending behavior; in other words, “how
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Both of these approaches have their drawbacks. Factor-based tests
do not provide strict guidance or standardization to the lower courts
and can be easily manipulated to justify a particular outcome. A definitional approach, on the other hand, provides a clearer legal standard
but risks being over- or underinclusive. To be sure, state courts and
legislatures would face a formidable challenge in drafting a legal definition of lack of control based on community norms. Still, this approach
seems to be the best way to assist the factfinder in conceptualizing the
legal standard so that it may be applied more fairly, predictably, and
consistently (rather than permitting decisions to be made ad hoc and
rationalized ex post).
Even an admittedly imperfect operationalization of lack of control
would still be an improvement on the present state of the law, which
leaves the factfinder utterly without guidance. Operationalizing the
definition would help guard against the fallacy of presuming lack of
control based upon the existence of a mental abnormality and would
prevent conclusory determinations that a defendant lacks control
based only on his past illegal conduct and clinical diagnoses. It would
also render trial court decisions more easily reviewable by higher
courts and would let defendants know how their dispositions and conduct will be judged upfront, thus presenting them with a better opportunity to rebut these characteristics in their defense.

much of a risk compulsion leads to.” Id. This definition is likely overinclusive—
capturing offenders who may simply be particularly risk-seeking and who freely choose to
commit the crime in all but the most exceptional circumstances while still exercising
perfect self-control.
To narrow this definition, one could permit the factfinder to consider whether the
offender wanted to act on his desire, or whether the offender wanted to stifle or overcome
the desire, but was unable to do so in the absence of exceptional circumstances (e.g.,
the policeman at the elbow). An offender who wants to act on his desires in certain
situations and accordingly does so is able to exercise self-control in those situations and
is therefore not eligible for civil confinement (but should only be relegated to the criminal justice system if and when he commits a crime). An offender who does not want to
commit the crime but cannot exercise discipline over his desires in all but exceptional
circumstances is one who has substantial difficulty controlling himself and should be
civilly confined to protect the public under the Crane rationale.
States could also raise the bar on what constitutes substantial difficulty controlling
oneself, requiring that the offender be unable to stop himself from offending even in
the most exceptional circumstances.
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B. Monitoring the Use of Expert Testimony
There are a number of ways that testimony from and reliance on
expert witnesses could be improved. First, the court should carefully
instruct the jury as to the role of expert testimony in the lack-ofcontrol determination. Second, the court should use its discretion
under the Rules of Evidence to exclude expert testimony on the ultimate issue of whether the defendant has serious difficulty controlling
behavior and restrict expert testimony to a qualitative description of
the defendant’s volitional capabilities based on the expert’s observa140
tions and experience in the field.
A court should carefully instruct the jury as to how it should consider expert testimony. Specifically, the jury should be informed that
(1) the issue of the defendant’s ability to control himself is a legal, not
a scientific, issue to be considered independently by the jury acting as
141
factfinder, although potentially informed by expert testimony; and
(2) that there is presently no consensus among medical professionals
142
on how to measure a person’s self-control. Expert witness testimony
should be considered with this legal and scientific background in
mind so that the expert’s apparent authority does not unduly persuade the jury.
Experts should also refrain from giving their opinions on the ultimate issue of whether the defendant has serious difficulty in controlling behavior, since this is a decision for the factfinder based on the
totality of the evidence and is measured by a legal rather than a clini143
cal approach. Allowing the court to exclude expert testimony would
be in keeping with the reasoning behind Federal Rule of Evidence
704(b), which restricts expert witnesses from rendering ultimate con140

See infra notes 133-36 & accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 137.
142
See Miller et al., supra note 133, at 46.
143
There are many examples of civil commitment cases in which judges have admitted ultimate opinions rendered by expert witnesses, and appellate courts have used
these opinions to justify upholding trial courts’ commitments of defendants. See, e.g.,
In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (considering statements from two examiners that the defendant “lack[ed] adequate ability to
control his sexual impulses” in reviewing the determination of defendant’s volitional
capacity); In re Preston, 629 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (summarizing a
doctor’s testimony that the defendant “met all of the criteria for commitment” under
two state statutes); Boyce v. Commonwealth, 691 S.E.2d 782, 785 (Va. 2010) (describing
how a clinical psychologist had formed the opinion that the defendant “met the criteria
for being a sexually violent predator” under the state statute and finding this opinion
supported by the evidence).
141
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clusions regarding the “mental state or condition” of a defendant in
144
Alternatively, courts should consider using Federal
criminal cases.
Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude expert testimony of ultimate conclusions and technical diagnoses when the probative value of this infor145
mation is low and the potential of prejudicing the jury is substantial.
In most situations, the probative value of an expert’s opinion regarding whether the defendant is substantially unable to control himself is
low, because the witness—no matter how knowledgeable in psychiatry—will not be an expert in applying the legal standard. A conclusion
from an authoritative figure on an issue that appears to be within his
expertise has the potential to strongly influence the jury. For similar
reasons, some commentators have recommended that courts go even
further by banning experts from discussing clinical diagnoses at all in
146
their testimonies.
Expert testimony may still play a useful role in the hearing process
by providing a qualitative description of the defendant’s particularized
volitional impairment, based on the expert’s observation and study of
147
the defendant. Experts should “attempt to directly evaluate the voli144

See FED. R. EVID. 704(b). While expert witnesses are typically permitted to render opinions on ultimate issues, this exception was added by the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 so that psychiatrists could not testify as to whether a defendant was
insane. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 190-91 (7th ed. 2011). The rationale behind this addition was to “eliminate the
confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory
conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier of fact.” Id. Further,
quoting the American Psychiatric Association, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted
that “[d]etermining whether a criminal defendant was legally insane is a matter for
legal fact-finders, not for experts.” Id. These rationales are no less applicable when
determining a defendant’s volitional impairment in a civil commitment proceeding. In
addition, as in the case of insanity, the defendant in this context faces the potential for
indefinite commitment.
145
See FED. R. EVID. 403.
146
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 603-04 (1978) (arguing that experts “should
not . . . be allowed to draw conclusions or to state their data in other than commonsense
and observational terms”); cf. Robert F. Schopp & Barbara J. Sturgis, Sexual Predators
and Legal Mental Illness for Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 437, 446 (1995) (arguing that expert testimony describing an individual’s psychological capacities is relevant
to the court’s determination of legal mental illness but that testimony regarding an
individual’s diagnosis is not relevant).
147
For a useful and comprehensive list of factors that experts should consider in
analyzing the offender’s volitional capacity, see Fabian, supra note 96, at 36. He recommends that expert witnesses take the following considerations into account:


[Offender h]istorically and currently meets criteria for a paraphilia diagnosis and preferably multiple paraphilias;
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tional impairment by scrutinizing . . . why [the defendant] decided to
commit sexual violence at some times or against some people or for
some reasons, but not at other times or against other people or for
148
Specifically, the main function of expert testimony
other reasons.”
should be to describe clearly and nontechnically the defendant’s relevant medical history, general demeanor, responses to studies and questioning, and other attributes that the expert believes bear on a person’s
volitional capacity. The expert should not render a conclusion about
whether this information amounts to a legal lack of control. Furthermore, the expert should be permitted to provide general information
regarding research in the area of volitional impairment and context
for the level of impairment that the expert observed in the defendant
as compared to other persons whom the expert has studied.
Restricting expert testimony to a qualitative description of the defendant’s volitional capacity and a presentation of contextual evidence
would not only prevent conclusory analyses from biasing the jury, but
would also serve a useful evidentiary function. Expert testimony provides the factfinder with a description of the defendant’s capacity for
self-control from a knowledgeable and experienced third party. This
information helps the factfinder form a more complete picture of the
defendant so that it can apply the legal standard regarding lack of control with consideration of the many facets of this complicated issue.
Restricting expert testimony in this way allows the factfinder to gain
additional insight to inform its ultimate determination of the main










[Offender has h]istory of frequent sex crimes in the community indicating sexual preoccupation and hypersexuality;
[Offender engages in f]requent acts of sexual violence within a closely
proximate period of time when at risk in the community (while on supervision or while participating in outpatient sex offender treatment
programming);
Offender engages in behavior when he is aware of a high probability of
getting apprehended;
Offender lacks insight and understanding into his offending behavior;
Offender lacks control of his behavior when it is unreasonable to expect
him to engage or not engage in a certain act under his particular circumstances (considering context of offender’s offending patterns);
Offender sexually acts out to relieve overwhelming anxiety and distress;
and
Offender’s strength of sexual desire interferes with his ability to consider
alternative courses of action, and decision/ability not to reoffend.

Id. (footnote omitted).
148
Hart & Kropp, supra note 135, at 564.
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issue of the case—whether the defendant has serious difficulty controlling his behavior
CONCLUSION
States have already committed thousands of sex offenders to men149
tal health facilities. The Supreme Court’s recent ruling on the con150
stitutionality of a federal civil commitment statute for sex offenders
suggests that even more offenders will soon be committed indefinitely.
In this high-stakes decision regarding the liberty of citizens, the Supreme Court has chosen to safeguard due process in commitment
proceedings by requiring proof that the defendant has “serious diffi151
culty in controlling behavior.” The Court’s decision not to elaborate
on this standard has given states wide discretion to determine what
amount and kind of proof is sufficient to justify commitment and has
resulted in numerous problems that sacrifice due process. Indeed, it
may be ideal to eliminate the control test in its entirety, as many states
have done with the insanity defense, because of its unclear and amorphous meaning. However, assuming that Crane’s constitutional holding will remain good law and that eliminating civil commitment
statutes for sexually violent predators would be politically unpopular, it
is important that we improve the current test to ensure that the protections of due process extend to this unpopular segment of society.

149

See Deming, supra note 2, at 441 (reporting that, as of May 2006, 3646 people
were being held as civilly committed sex offenders).
150
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010).
151
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).

